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Duquesne Law Review
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-FREEDOM OF RELIGION-COURT ORDERED
MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR INFANTS-The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has ruled that an' infant is not a "neglected child" under the
Pennsylvania Juvenile Court Act if the parents, on religious grounds,
refuse to allow the infant to have surgery requiring a blood transfusion,
when the child's life is not immediately endangered by his physical con-
dition.
Green Appeal, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972).
Ricky Ricardo Green, an infant of sixteen years of age, had had two
attacks of poliomyelitis, which resulted in weakness to all four ex-
tremities and the trunk muscles, severe obesity, and a ninety-four degree
curvature of the spine. Ricky had become bed-ridden, a "sitter" unable
to stand or ambulate. Doctors agreed that if nothing were done, Ricky
would lose his ability to sit up, and would become a permanent invalid.
The only way the child could be cured was through a "spinal fusion,"
a dangerous operation which involved moving a bone from the infant's
pelvis to his spine. The operation could not be performed without a
blood transfusion. Ricky's mother, a Jehovah's Witness, would not con-
sent to the blood transfusion which her religion views as an "eating of
the blood" forbidden by the Bible.'
The Director of the State Hospital for Crippled Children at Eliza-
bethtown, Pennsylvania, filed a petition to have Ricky declared a
"neglected child ' 2 under the Juvenile Court Act, have the court ap-
point a guardian for the child,3 and have the guardian commit the child
to the state hospital.4 The Court of Common Pleas, Family Division,
1. For a full explanation of the prohibition of blood transfusions by Jehovah's Wit-
nesses see Ford, Refusal of Blood Transfusions by Jehovah's Witnesses, 10 CATHOLIC LAw.
212 (1964).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 243(5) (1965):
The words "neglected child" include . . . (c) A child whose parent, guardian, custo-
dian or legal representative neglects or refuses to provide proper or necessary sub-
sistence, education, medical or surgical care, or other care necessary for his or her
health, morals or well being.
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 250 (1965):
At the hearing, or any continuation thereof, the judge or judges shall, after an in-
quiry of the facts, determine whether the best interests and welfare of a child and
the State require the care, guidance and control of such child, and shall make an
order accordingly.
The court may-
(b) Commit a child to the care, guidance and control of some reputable citizen
of good moral character, subject to the supervision of a probation officer and to re-
port as required in clause (a) of this section.
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 871 (1965):
440
Vol. 11: 440, 1973
Recent Decisions
Juvenile Branch, of Philadelphia dismissed the petition. 5 The Penn-
sylvania Superior Court unanimously reversed,6 citing the New York
case of In re Sampson.7 The case was appealed to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court.
In a four to three decision," the court reversed and remanded the case
to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia, Family Division, Juve-
nile Branch. The majority opinion held that committing Ricky to a
hospital would violate the free exercise clause of the first amendment
of the United States Constitution9 as applied to the states through the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The court interpreted
the free exercise clause to mean that the state may interfere with a
parent's religious practices only when the interest of the state is of such
a magnitude that the state's interest overwhelms the constitutional
freedom to practice one's religion. In this case, the child's life was not
immediately imperiled by his physical condition. While the court ex-
pressed no opinion concerning how it would act had the minor's life
been so imperiled, it stated that when there is no danger of death, the
interest of the state would not override the appellant's freedom of re-
ligion. The court also stated that it desired to avoid the medical and
philosophical problem of where a court should stop in ordering surgery
against a parent's religious objections in non-fatal cases. 10
However, the court did not stop at determining that the interest of
the state was not overriding; rather the case was remanded to the com-
mon pleas court to determine the desires of the sixteen-year-old infant.
The court pointed out that Ricky had never had a chance to give his
views on the matter; that he may or may not have the same opinion as
his mother; and that he may or may not be a Jehovah's Witness. The
majority reasoned that its decision would have its ultimate effect on
the boy, and, therefore, his desires should be taken into account."' The
Crippled children whose parents or guardians fail or are financially unable to pro-
vide suitable medical and surgical aid, treatment, and education, when necessary,
may, with the consent of the parents or guardian of such child, be committed to a
crippled children's home or orthopaedic hospital or other institution.
5. Civil No. 174612 (Pa. C.P. Phila., July 7, 1971).
6. Green Case, 220 Pa. Super. 191, 286 A.2d 681 (1971).
7. 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Family Ct. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 37 App. Div.
2d 668, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d
686 (1972).
8. Green Appeal, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972).
9. U.S. CONsT. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
10. 448 Pa. at 348, 292 A.2d at 392.
11. Pennsylvania's position in remanding the case to determine the wishes of the child
is in accord with its recent decisions extending an infant's rights. In custody cases, the
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court reserved judgment on what the decision would be if the child's
desires should conflict with the parent's.
The dissent, citing Prince v. Massachusetts,12 stated that while parents
may have a right to act as martyrs for themselves, they have no such
right in respect to their children. The dissent reasoned that the state
may act as parens patriae to restrict the natural parent's control, and
that its interest in the well-being of its youth overrides any religious
convictions of the parent. The dissent objected to the court's distinc-
tion between fatal and non-fatal illnesses. It noted that the statute de-
fines a "neglected child" as one whose parent "neglects or refuses to
provide proper or necessary subsistence, education, medical or surgical
care, or other care necessary for his or her health . . ."13 "Health," ac-
cording to the dissent, does not necessarily deal with life and death;
rather the purpose of the statute is to make certain that juveniles such
as Ricky are able to enjoy a relatively normal life.
The dissent also disapproved of remanding the case to determine the
minor's preference, noting that the boy, because of his crippled condi-
tion, was always under the direct guidance and control of his mother.
They felt that no sixteen-year-old in Ricky's position should be con-
fronted with the terrible dilemma of whether to follow the convictions
of his mother or to grab the opportunity to live a more normal life.
The constitutional freedom of religion is not absolute. Courts have
approved and enforced laws outlawing bigamy,14 forbidding child
labor, 5 outlawing the handling of poisonous snakes,' 6 and requiring
the fluoridation of water"7 against persons who claimed it was their
religious duty to violate these laws. However, first amendment rights
can only be abridged when there is a "compelling state interest."' 8 It
preference of an intelligent and mature child is to be considered in determining custody.
Snellgrose Adoption Case, 432 Pa. 158, 247 A.2d 596 (1968). The sole inquiry in custody
hearings is what would serve the best interests of the child. Id. A sixteen-year-old of
average intelligence has been deemed capable of waiving his constitutional rights after
he had been accused of murder. Commonwealth v. Moses, 446 Pa. 350, 287 A.2d 131 (1971).
An unemancipated minor may now sue his parents for negligence. Falco v. Pados, 444
Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971). But see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), where the
United States Supreme Court refused to consider the views of Amish children whose
parents refused to allow them to attend secondary school because of the parents' religious
beliefs.
12. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
13. 448 Pa. at 354, 292 A.2d at 395 (emphasis supplied by the dissent).
14. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
15. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
16. State v. Massey, 229 N.C. 734, 51 S.E.2d 179 (1949), dismissed sub nom. for lack
of a substantial federal question, Bunn v. North Carolina, 336 U.S. 942 (1949).
17. Baer v. City of Bend, 206 Ore. 221, 292 P.2d 134 (1956).
18. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1962).
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must be shown that the religious practice constitutes a substantial threat
to safety, peace, or order.19
Although Pennsylvania courts had never before ruled on a case where
the parents refused to allow a child to have an operation for religious
reasons, there were previous Pennsylvania cases in which the parent
refused to allow the operation for non-religious reasons. In the case of
In re Tuttendario20 the court refused to order an operation for a seven-
year-old boy who was suffering from rickets and would probably be
crippled for life without surgery, saying that the parents' rights will be
abridged only when they, with malicious intent, have inflicted physical
or moral injury upon their children. Similarly, the court refused to
order a minor to give blood for a blood transplant in Zaman v.
Schultz.2 1 In Marsh's Case22 the court declared a child "neglected" after
his parents had refused to allow him to have a smallpox vaccination. In
Heinemann's Appeal23 the court took custody from the father of two
children because the father, who believed in healing by pricking the
skin, refused to give the children adequate medical attention, but the
court did so only after three of the father's five children had died of
disease.
In non-emergency cases in Pennsylvania, a doctor cannot operate on
a minor child unless the child is declared a "neglected child" as pro-
vided for in the Juvenile Court Act.24 If the doctor operates without
the permission of the parents or without court permission, he will be
liable for damages.25 Pennsylvania courts have been reluctant to exercise
their power to take away the parents' right to approve the operation. 2
Simply the fact that the child would be better off by changing guardians
is not enough.27 The power of the court is not to decide what is in the
best interests of the child, but whether the child is neglected.2 8 This is
19. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
20. 21 Pa. Dist. 561 (Q.S. Phila. 1912). But see In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126
P.2d 765 (1942), where the court refused to order the amputation of a child's enlarged,
deformed, and totally useless left arm, stating that it was not in a position to decide that
it was more important to risk the infant's life in surgery than to have the child go through
life crippled and burdened by his abnormality.
21. 19 Pa. D. & C. 309 (C.P. Cambria Co. 1933).
22. 140 Pa. Super. 472, 14 A.2d 368 (1940).
23. 96 Pa. 112 (1880).
24. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 243(5)(c) (1965).
25. Zaman v. Schultz, 19 Pa. D. & C. 309 (C.P. Cambria Co. 1933).





a serious matter, and will be done only when the court feels it is
absolutely necessary.29
Courts in other jurisdictions which have ruled on the issue have un-
animously found that when the death of an infant is imminent, a blood
transfusion will be ordered despite the religious objections of the
parents,30 because, in the courts' opinions, a parent does not have the
right to deny to the child a chance to live. In Hoener v. Bertinato1 the
court ordered a blood transfusion for a baby before its birth; citing
medical evidence that the child's life would become endangered because
its Rh factor would conflict with the pregnant mother's. The constitu-
tionality of ordering a transfusion over the parents' religious objections
when death is probable was upheld by the United States Supreme Court
in Jehovah's Witnesses v. King's County Hospital.2
Courts have allowed medical attention to minors over the religious
objections of the parents when the safety of the general community is
involved, as with compulsory vaccinations.3 3 The only cases where
courts have discussed whether to allow an operation over the religious
objections of the parents when there is no danger of death and when
there is no danger to the safety of the general community are Matter of
Seiferth,34 In re Sampson,35 and In re Karwath36 In Seiferth,8 7 the New
York Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision not to declare
a fourteen-year-old boy who could not speak properly because of a cleft
palate and a harelip a "neglected child." The father refused to consent
to the operation because he believed in "mental healing," though he
did not belong to any organized religion which supported this belief.
There was testimony that the infant might have serious psychological
problems if the operation were not done, and that each year that went
by with no surgery meant it would be harder for the boy to be able to
29. Id.
30. People ex rel Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952); Craig v.
State, 220 Md. 590, 155 A.2d 684 (1959); Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. Civ. App.
1952); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962); People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201,
68 N.E. 243 (1913); In re Santos, 16 App. Div. 2d 755, 227 N.Y.S.2d 450, appeal dismissed,
12 N.Y.2d 672, 185 N.E.2d 904, 233 N.Y.S.2d 465 (1962); Application of Brooklyn Hosp.,
45 Misc. 2d 914, 258 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Sup. Ct. 1965); In re Clark, 21 Ohio Op. 2d 86, 185
N.E.2d 128 (C.P. 1962); Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812 (rex. Civ. App. 1947).
31. 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1961).
32. 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash.), af'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 598 (1968).
33. Wright v. DeWitt School District, 238 Ark. 906, 385 S.W.2d 644 (1965); Cude v.
State, 237 Ark. 927, 377 S.W.2d 816 (1964).
34. 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955).
35. 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641, aff'd per curiam, 37 App. Div. 2d 668, 323
2N.Y.S.2d 253, afJ'd per curiam, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972).
36. 199 N.W.2d 147 (Iowa 1972).
,37. 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955).
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speak correctly even if the operation would take place. The court em-
phasized that the child was antagonistic toward the surgery. It said that
since this type of medical treatment required the cooperation of the
patient to be successful, it would be better to wait for the child to come
,of age, and then let him decide on whether to have the operation.38
The facts in Sampson, 9 are virtually the same as in the present case.
A fifteen-year-old was suffering from Von Reckinghausen's disease
which resulted in massive disfigurement of the face and neck. The
disease caused the boy great psychological harm, and, because of his
grotesqueness, he had been kept out of school. Although capable of
learning, he was a virtual illiterate. When the mother, a Jehovah's
Witness, would not consent to the needed blood transfusion, the New
York Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision declaring the
minor a "neglected child" and ordering the operation, despite the fact
that the operation's risk would decrease the longer it was postponed.40
The court ruled that the state's interest in the well-being of the infant
was overriding.41 The court said that an operation in a non-fatal case
can be ordered over the religious objections of a minor's parents, and
the discretion of the trial court on this matter shall prevail since the
trial judge has the best opportunity to observe the parties involved.42
In Karwath,48 the Iowa Supreme Court ordered the removal of two
juveniles' inflamed tonsils and adenoids to prevent further middle ear
infections and tonsillitis despite the father's religious objections. The
worst possible consequenses of not having the operation would be
rheumatic fever and a loss of hearing. The court stated that there need
not be a danger to life or limb for it to order the operation where the
best interests of the children are involved.44
Certainly, the state has a great interest in having its youth healthy
and productive, able to contribute to the advancement of society. Yet,
parents do have a right to freely practice their religion and to control
their children. The function of the court is to try to balance these con-
flicting interests and find an equitable solution. It is suggested that in
some instances the court should order an operation over the religious
38. 309 N.Y. at 85, 127 N.E.2d at 823.
39. 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641, aff'd per curiam, 37 App. Div. 2d 668, 323
N.Y.S.2d 253, aff'd per curiam, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972).
40. 65 Misc. 2d at 672, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
41. 65 Misc. 2d at 669, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 652.
42. 29 N.Y.2d at 901, 278 N.E.2d at 978, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 687.
43. 199 N.W.2d 147 (Iowa 1972).
44. Id. at 150.
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objections of the parents despite the fact that the child's life is not in
danger.
However, an operation should not be ordered when the condition is
not so harmful that it cannot be remedied by the infant after he reaches
majority. This allows the ultimate right to consent to remain with the
person most greatly affected and will not necessitate the usurping of the
traditional rights of the parents by the courts. It is true, as stated in
Sampson,45 that the disability may have a harmful psychological effect
on the infant even though he can order the operation when he becomes
an adult. It should be noted that there would also be psychological
harm through the court-ordered operation as the child would know he
was going through surgery without the consent of his parents.
Neither should the operation be ordered when there is little prob-
ability of further substantial deterioration. In such a situation the
parents are aware of how great the burden of the child's condition is
on both the parents and the child. Although there will be a burden on
the state, it will not be an additional one, but rather the continuation
of an already existing condition. In this instance the parents' right to
practice their religion should be superior to the state's right to relieve
itself of the onus. In Green Appeal4" the child was incapacitated, and
without the operation would probably become more incapacitated.
However, since the mother was aware of the problems of coping with
a crippled child, and there already was a burden present for the state,
the transfusion should not have been ordered.
But, what about the case where the child is presently relatively
normal, but without the operation will become permanently abnormal
-the sighted child in danger of becoming blind, the walking child in
danger of becoming crippled, or, as in Karwath,47 the child with normal
hearing in danger of becoming deaf? In this instance the parents have
had no experience with a disabled child and may not be aware of all of
the consequences of not allowing the operation. Also, if the state does
not order the operation it will be subjecting itself to an additional
burden. In this situation, it is suggested, the state's interest would be
superior to the parents' right to free exercise of religion, and the opera-
tion should be ordered. Since, under this standard, the circumstance in
which the operation should be ordered is fairly clear-cut, it would over-
45. 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641, aff'd per curiam, 37 App. Div. 2d 668, 323
N.Y.S.2d 253, aff'd per curiam, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972).
46. 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972).
47. 199 N.W.2d 147 (Iowa 1972).
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come the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's philosophical dilemma as to
how serious a non-fatal illness should be before a court should step
in.48 While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court may be correct in de-
termining that there is no compelling state interest in the present case
concerning an already-handicapped child, it is difficult to understand
how it would be able to decide that preserving the usefulness to society
of a presently healthy infant is not a compelling interest of the state.
Joel M. Dresbold
48. See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-34 (1972), where the United States
Supreme Court in dicta implied that there are circumstances where a court should limit
the parents' free exercise of religion where the child's health or safety is jeopardized.
447
